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SHIFTING TARGETS ON SHIFTING FEES: 
ATTORNEY’S FEES IN THE WAKE OF SINGER 
MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS, INC. v. MILGRAM 
Abstract: On June 15, 2011, in Singer Management Consultants, Inc. v. Mil-
gram, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit sitting en banc held 
that a temporary restraining order vacated after a defendant’s change in 
position is insufficient to confer prevailing-party status for purposes of 
awarding attorney’s fees. As a result, parties who obtain in-court relief 
short of a formal court order may not be able to obtain attorney’s fees. 
This Comment argues that in arriving at that decision, the Singer court too 
narrowly construed the phrase “judicially sanctioned.” It further advises 
that, to avoid this result, attorneys who plan to seek fees should request a 
permanent formal order, which courts have recognized as sufficient to 
confer prevailing-party status. 
Introduction 
 In the United States, under the “American Rule,” parties to litiga-
tion must pay their own attorney’s fees.1 Certain statutes, however, 
carve out “fee-shifting” exceptions to this rule.2 Many of these statutes 
authorize courts to award reasonable attorney’s fees to prevailing par-
ties.3 For example, the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976 
(“Fees Awards Act”) permits courts to grant prevailing parties attorney’s 
fees in civil rights cases.4  Congress passed this law to encourage indi-
                                                                                                                      
1 Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 
U.S. 598, 602 (2001); People Against Police Violence v. City of Pittsburgh (PAPV ), 520 F.3d 
226, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). 
2 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 602–03. 
3 Robert L. Rossi, Attorneys’ Fees § 10:3, at 16–17 (3d ed. 2011); see Buckhannon, 
532 U.S. at 601–02; see, e.g., Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(i)(3)(B)(i) (2006) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ 
fees as part of the costs—to a prevailing party . . . .”); Fair Housing Amendments Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (2006) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party 
. . . a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs.”); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12205 (2006) (“[T]he court . . . , in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a 
reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and costs . . . .”). 
4 Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (providing that 
courts “may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee”); Buckhannon, 532 
U.S. at 602; PAPV, 520 F.3d at 231–32; Martin A. Schwartz, Attorneys Fees in Federal Civil 
Rights Cases, 27 Touro L. Rev. 113, 115 (2011). 
807 
808 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:807 
viduals to vindicate their civil rights, thereby enforcing civil rights laws.5 
Because the remedy in civil rights suits is often an injunction, plaintiffs 
act as private attorneys general, obtaining relief not only for themselves 
but also for others.6 Courts typically treat prevailing party fee-shifting 
statutes similarly; principles applied under one such statute will be ap-
plied under other such statutes as well.7 
 Notwithstanding this history, in 2011, in Singer Management Con-
sultants, Inc. v. Milgram, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
sitting en banc dealt a significant blow to “prevailing parties” seeking to 
claim attorney’s fees under fee-shifting statutes.8 Specifically, the court 
concluded that a party may not collect as a prevailing party from adver-
saries that relinquish a claim in in-court proceedings.9 In so doing, the 
court undermined the congressional intent behind creating a fee-
shifting exception to the “American Rule” for parties vindicating their 
civil rights.10 
 Part I of this Comment outlines the factual and procedural history 
leading up to the Third Circuit’s decision.11 It then provides the legal 
landscape from which this decision emerged.12 Part II explores the rea-
soning used by the majority and the dissents in the en banc decision.13 
Finally, Part III argues that the Third Circuit’s decision unnecessarily 
narrowed parties’ rights in civil rights litigation.14 It further recom-
mends that, to avoid this result, attorneys who plan to seek attorney’s 
fees should request a permanent formal order.15 
                                                                                                                      
5 See S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at 2–3 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5909–10, 
1976 WL 14051. 
6 See id. at 3. 
7 Rossi, supra note 3, § 10:3. 
8 See Singer Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. Milgram, 650 F.3d 223, 241 (3d Cir. 2011) (en 
banc) (Aldisert, J., dissenting). The case name is something of a misnomer because, by the 
time the case reached the en banc court, Singer Management had dropped out of the suit 
and Live Gold was the only plaintiff remaining. See Reply Brief for Appellant at 1, 14 n.2, 
Singer, 650 F.3d 223 (No. 09-2238). 
9 See Singer, 650 F.3d at 231. 
10 See S. Rep. No. 94-1011, at 2–3 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5909–10, 
1976 WL 14051. 
11 See infra notes 16–46 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 47–75 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 76–99 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 100–127 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 125–127 and accompanying text. 
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I. Singer Management Consultants, Inc. v. Milgram: The Road 
to Requesting Prevailing Party Attorney’s Fees 
A. Events Leading up to Legal Action 
 Live Gold Operations, Inc. (“Live Gold”) held common-law unreg-
istered trademarks for the names of two 1950s Doo-Wop musical groups 
known as “The Platters” and “The Cornell Gunter Coasters.”16 Under 
these unregistered trademarks, Live Gold managed and promoted these 
groups’ musical recordings and performances.17 In August 2007, both 
groups were scheduled to perform at a two-week concert series at the 
Atlantic City Hilton Hotel.18 Upon learning about the concert, the State 
of New Jersey Attorney General’s Office (the “State”) informed Live 
Gold that its use of the trademarks “The Platters” and “The Cornell 
Gunter Coasters” might violate the New Jersey Deceptive Practices in 
Musical Performances Act, commonly referred to as the Truth in Music 
Act (TIM Act).19 In response, Live Gold provided the State with evi-
                                                                                                                      
16 Singer, 650 F.3d at 224–25. At common law, a party acquires ownership of a trade-
mark by using the mark in a particular market. Emergency One, Inc. v. Am. Fire Eagle 
Engine Co., 332 F.3d 264, 267 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing United Drug Co. v. Theodore Recta-
nus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97–98 (1918)). An owner of a trademark may choose to register the 
mark under the federal Lanham Act, but such registration is not necessary to obtain pro-
tection for the mark. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 767–68 (1992); 
800 Spirits Inc. v. Liquor By Wire, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 2d 675, 678 (D.N.J. 1998). The Lanham 
Act protects both registered trademarks and qualifying (i.e., distinctive) unregistered 
trademarks. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768. 
17 Singer, 650 F.3d at 224–25. 
18 Id. at 225. 
19 Id.; see Deceptive Practices in Musical Performances Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:32B-1 
to B-3 (West 2010). The TIM Act is one of many recently enacted state statutes governing 
how a musical group may advertise itself for live performances. Jennifer K. Craft & Robert 
B. Kouchoukos, Setting the Record Straight, Nev. Law., Mar. 2009, at 6, 7. In pertinent part, 
the Act provides that “[a] person shall not advertise or conduct a live musical performance 
or production through the use of an affiliation, connection or association between the 
performing group and the recording group unless” one of five criteria is met: (1) the per-
forming group must own a registered trademark for the group, (2) at least one member of 
the performing group must have been a member of the recording group and must have a 
legal right to the name, (3) the performance must be identified in all promotion as a “sa-
lute” or “tribute,” (4) the advertising relates to a performance taking place outside of the 
state, or (5) the performance is expressly authorized by the recording group. § 2A:32B-
2(a)–(e). “Person” is not defined by the Act and, therefore, this statute likely makes liable 
a broad swath of entities, including not only members of the performing group and their 
managers but also the performance venue. See id. § 2A:32B-1; Craft & Kouchoukos, supra, 
at 6–7. Compare N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:32B-2 (not defining “person”), with Nev. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 598.0922 (LexisNexis 2010) (defining “person” to exclude the performance venue 
and its owners, operators, and managers “unless the performance venue has a controlling 
or majority ownership interest in and produces the performing group”). 
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dence of its ownership of unregistered trademarks in each group’s 
name.20 The State, however, was not satisfied that unregistered trade-
marks should be treated the same as registered trademarks under the 
Act.21 Accordingly, the State advised the Hilton Hotel that it could avoid 
liability under the Act by ticketing and advertising the concert as a “trib-
ute” or “salute.”22 The Hilton Hotel complied and litigation ensued.23 
B. Litigation and Procedural Posture of the Underlying Case 
 The day before the first Hilton concert in August 2007, Live Gold 
sued the State seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) and in-
junctive relief against the State’s enforcement of the Act.24 Live Gold 
argued that the State’s enforcement of the TIM Act conflicted with the 
federal Lanham Act and violated Live Gold’s civil rights.25 The U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of New Jersey issued the TRO, stating that 
there was “sufficient problem with the State’s position” and “a likeli-
hood of success on the merits”; further, in issuing the order, it reasoned 
that it would have an opportunity to “get to the merits” of the case at 
the preliminary injunction hearing.26 The TRO enjoined the State 
from interfering with the Hilton concert in any way.27 
 Several weeks later, after the Hilton concert series had ended, the 
district court held a hearing on the preliminary injunction.28 During 
the hearing, the court made clear that it did not agree with the State’s 
arguments.29 The court repeatedly rejected the State’s arguments and 
suggested that the State interpret the Act to allow owners of unregis-
tered trademarks to perform under the trademarked name without any 
additional requirements.30 
 After the court repeatedly rejected the State’s position, the State 
reversed its position, adopting Live Gold’s and the court’s interpreta-
                                                                                                                      
20 Singer, 650 F.3d at 225. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id.; see supra note 16 (discussing unregistered trademarks and the Lanham Act). 
26 Singer, 650 F.3d at 226. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. The State, both in its brief and at the hearing, contended that an unregistered 
trademark complied with the TIM Act only if the performing group included an original 
group member, was expressly authorized to use the mark by an original group member, or 
identified itself as a tribute or salute. Id. 
30 Id. 
2012] Attorney’s Fees in the Wake of Milgram 811 
tion of the Truth in Music Act.31 Furthermore, when questioned, the 
State confirmed its new interpretation of the Act.32 As a result, the 
court stated that the State would be “bound” by this new interpreta-
tion.”33 Thus, when Live Gold moved for summary disposition, the 
court, reasoning that the State’s new position resolved the “basic legal 
problem,” concluded that it saw no need to “go any further.”34 Addi-
tionally, the court summarized the State’s new position, declaring that 
the owner of a common law trademark would be treated the same as 
the owner of a registered trademark for purposes of enforcing the 
Act.35 The court then vacated the TRO—which had already expired by 
its own terms—and opted not to convert the TRO to a preliminary in-
junction.36 
 Live Gold’s counsel subsequently sought leave under the Civil 
Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 197637 (Fees Awards Act) to re-
cover its attorney’s fees and costs incurred in representing Live Gold 
from the State.38 This request formed the basis of the Third Circuit’s 
hearing of Singer in 2011.39 
C. Procedural Posture of Live Gold’s Attorney’s Fees Claim 
 A magistrate judge denied Live Gold’s application for attorney’s 
fees and costs.40 It did so by concluding that Live Gold was not a pre-
vailing party as required by the Fees Awards Act because the State had 
voluntarily changed its position.41 Live Gold sought review of the order 
by the district court.42 The district court upheld the magistrate judge’s 
ruling and Live Gold appealed.43 On August 5, 2010, the Third Circuit, 
vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case for entry of an 
award of attorney’s fees to Live Gold.44 But on September 1, 2010, the 
                                                                                                                      
31 Id. 
32 Singer, 650 F.3d at 226. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 226–27. 
35 Id. at 227. 
36 Id. 
37 See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006). 
38 Singer, 650 F.3d at 227. 
39 Id. at 228. 
40 Id. at 227. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 227–28. 
44 Singer Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. Milgram, No. 09-2238, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 
16214, at *2 (3d Cir. Aug. 5, 2010), vacated, 619 F.3d 301 (3d Cir. 2010), rev’d en banc, 650 
F.3d 223 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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Third Circuit granted a rehearing en banc, thereby vacating the Third 
Circuit’s August opinion.45 The en banc Third Circuit then affirmed 
the district court’s order, holding that Live Gold did not meet prevail-
ing-party status and, as such, should not be awarded attorney’s fees.46 
D. The Legal Landscape of the Prevailing Party Theory 
 Many fee-shifting statutes allow prevailing parties to recover attor-
ney’s fees from their opponents.47 Because these fee-shifting statutes do 
not define the term,48 what confers “prevailing party” status has often 
been the subject of litigation.49 Essentially, to be awarded attorney’s 
fees as a prevailing party under a fee-shifting statute: (1) the legal rela-
tionship between the plaintiff and the defendant must have changed,50 
(2) the change must be “judicially sanctioned,”51 and (3) the change 
must “achieve[] some of the benefit the part[y] sought in bringing the 
suit.”52 Furthermore, a plaintiff must “receive at least some relief on the 
merits of his claim before he can be said to prevail.”53 Nevertheless, a 
“voluntary change in conduct, . . . lacks the necessary judicial imprima-
tur on the change.”54 
 This final condition, that a voluntary change in conduct is not suf-
ficient to confer prevailing-party status, arose in Buckhannon Board & 
Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources 
in 2001.55 In Buckhannon, a corporation sued the State of West Virginia, 
claiming that a provision of state law violated the Fair Housing 
Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA) and the Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990 (ADA).56 While the parties were conducting discovery, the 
state legislature eliminated the offending provision, effectively mooting 
                                                                                                                      
45 Singer Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. Milgram, 619 F.3d 301, 301 (3d Cir. 2010). 
46 Singer, 650 F.3d at 232. 
47 See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text. 
48 Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 837 F.2d 190, 192 (5th Cir. 
1988), rev’d on other grounds by 489 U.S. 782 (1989); see 42. U.S.C. §§ 1981–1996B (not con-
taining a definition of “prevailing party”); Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603. 
49 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603; see Singer, 650 F.3d at 228 (detailing requirements ar-
ticulated in previous Supreme Court cases (citing Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605; Tex. State 
Teachers Ass’n, 489 U.S. at 792; Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1987); Hensley v. Ecker-
hart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 757 (1980))). 
50 Tex. State Teachers Ass’n, 489 U.S. at 792. 
51 Singer, 650 F.3d at 228 (citing Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605). 
52 See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
53 Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 760 (citing Hanrahan, 446 U.S. at 757). 
54 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605. 
55 See id. 
56 Id. at 600–01. 
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the case.57 Accordingly, the district court granted the State’s motion to 
dismiss the case as moot.58 The corporation then moved for attorney’s 
fees as the “prevailing party” under the FHAA and ADA, relying on the 
catalyst theory.59 The so-called “catalyst theory” granted a plaintiff pre-
vailing-party status if its suit prompted voluntary action of the defen-
dant which afforded the plaintiff some or all of the relief sought.60 
 The Supreme Court in Buckhannon, however, held that the catalyst 
theory is not an appropriate basis for granting prevailing-party status 
and thus permitting attorney’s fees under federal fee-shifting statutes.61 
Instead, the Court identified two resolutions which carry the judicial 
imprimatur necessary to confer prevailing-party status: judgments on the 
merits and court-ordered consent decrees.62 Significantly, these resolu-
tions were provided merely as examples of outcomes that the Supreme 
Court has deemed appropriate to confer prevailing-party status.63 The 
Court did not foreclose other, yet-to-be-identified outcomes from being 
added to the list.64 
 Nevertheless, the Court did identify several instances in which at-
torney’s fees should not be awarded: (1) when the plaintiff has “se-
cured the reversal of a directed verdict”;65 (2) when the plaintiff has 
“acquired a judicial pronouncement that the defendant has violated 
the Constitution unaccompanied by ‘judicial relief’” such as when a 
party has only obtained an interlocutory ruling that his complaint 
                                                                                                                      
57 Id. at 601. 
58 Id. 
59 See id. Both the FHAA and the ADA contain fee-shifting provisions, similar to the 
fee-shifting provision of the Fees Awards Act, which allow attorney’s fees to be awarded to 
prevailing parties. Id. at 601, 602–03; see Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3613(c)(2) (2006) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a 
reasonable attorney’s fee and costs.”); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12205 (2006) (“[T]he court . . . , in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a 
reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and costs . . . .”). 
60 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 601; Rossi, supra note 3, § 10:3. 
61 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605, 610; Rossi, supra note 3, § 10:3. Although the Buckhan-
non case specifically addressed the fee-shifting provisions contained in the FHAA and the 
ADA, the Court made it clear it was rejecting the use of the catalyst theory with any fee-
shifting provision using the “prevailing party” language. See 532 U.S. at 603 & n.4 (citing 
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 n.7); J.C. v. Reg’l Sch. Dist. 10, Bd. of Educ., 278 F.3d 119, 123 (2d 
Cir. 2002); accord John T. ex rel. Paul T. v. Del. Cnty. Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 560–
61 (3d Cir. 2003); Rossi, supra note 3, § 10:3. 
62 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604. Under the Supreme Court’s interpretation, consent 
decrees also include settlement agreements enforced through consent decrees. Id. 
63 See id. at 604–05; Singer, 650 F.3d at 231. 
64 See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604–05; Singer, 650 F.3d at 231; id. at 233 (Roth, J., dis-
senting). 
65 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605–06 (citing Hanrahan, 446 U.S. at 759). 
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should not have been dismissed for failure to state a constitutional 
claim;66 or (3) when there has been a “nonjudicial alteration of actual 
circumstances,” such as when a legislature revises an offending law.67 
 Following Buckhannon, in 2008, the Third Circuit awarded prevail-
ing-party status under the Fees Awards Act in People Against Police Vio-
lence v. City of Pittsburgh (PAPV ).68 In PAPV, the court conferred prevail-
ing-party status when: (1) the district court had proclaimed that a city 
ordinance was unconstitutional on its face;69 (2) the court had issued a 
preliminary injunction that lasted two years (while the parties worked 
together to revise the ordinance);70 and (3) the ordinance had been 
revised so that it satisfied all of the plaintiffs’ concerns before the court 
lifted the injunction and closed the case.71 Significantly, in reaching its 
decision, the court emphasized that: (1) the City’s change in practice 
was in no way voluntary72 (because it opposed the TRO and prelimi-
nary injunctions at the first two hearings and, after the injunction’s im-
position, the injunction “remained mandatory and subject to judicial 
enforcement”);73 (2) the preliminary injunction was not “dissolved for 
                                                                                                                      
66 Id. (quoting Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 760). 
67 Id. at 606. The Court elaborated in a footnote that “private settlements do not entail 
the judicial approval and oversight involved in consent decrees. And federal jurisdiction to 
enforce a private contractual settlement will often be lacking unless the terms of the 
agreement are incorporated into the order of dismissal.” Id. at 604 n.7 (citations omitted). 
68 See PAPV, 520 F.3d at 229. PAPV is singled out for inclusion here because the majority 
in Singer devoted substantial space to contrasting Singer and PAPV. See Singer, 650 F.3d at 
229. The Third Circuit, however, has also awarded prevailing-party status in other cases 
post-Buckhannon. See P.N. v. Clementon Bd. of Educ., 442 F.3d 848, 856, 857 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(holding plaintiffs who obtained consent decrees entered by administrative law judge in 
administrative proceedings to be prevailing parties because they not only “succeeded on a 
significant issue” but “received all that they sought”); Truesdell v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 290 
F.3d 159, 161, 165 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that plaintiff was the prevailing party when par-
ties reached a settlement agreement during preliminary injunction hearing and agree-
ment was memorialized in court order containing settlement terms, mandatory language, 
and means for judicial enforcement). Conversely, the Third Circuit has refused to award 
prevailing-party status in other post-Buckhannon cases. See John T., 318 F.3d at 558–59, 560 
(determining that the plaintiff was not the prevailing party when a preliminary injunction 
was not merit-based and the agreement reached through out-of-court negotiations was not 
endorsed by “judicial imprimatur”); J.O. v. Orange Twp. Bd. of Educ., 287 F.3d 267, 272, 
273–74 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that “stay-put” orders that simply maintain status quo and 
are not merit-based could not confer prevailing-party status). 
69 See PAPV, 520 F.3d at 229. 
70 See id. at 228, 235–36. 
71 See id. at 230. 
72 Id. at 234. 
73 Id. at 235. 
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lack of entitlement”;74 and (3) the injunction did not simply maintain 
the status quo but rather “afforded plaintiffs virtually all of the substan-
tive relief they sought.”75 
II. Conflicting Interpretations of What Confers Prevailing-
Party Status Post-Buckhannon 
 The en banc majority in Singer concluded that Live Gold was not a 
prevailing party under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act76 
(“Fees Awards Act”) because it did not receive a judgment on the mer-
its and the State’s actions after the TRO issued were voluntary.77 The 
court based its conclusion that Live Gold did not receive a judgment on 
the merits on two intermediary conclusions.78 First, the TRO was not 
issued on the merits.79 Second, no judgment was issued on the merits 
because the State mooted the case at the preliminary injunction hear-
ing by adopting Live Gold’s interpretation of the Act.80 
 The Third Circuit concluded that the TRO was not issued on the 
merits by distinguishing Singer from the Third Circuit’s 2008 decision 
People Against Police Violence v. City of Pittsburgh (PAPV).81 First, the court 
observed that the Singer court never ruled that the challenged law was 
unconstitutional, as the PAPV court did, but rather based the TRO on a 
“likelihood of success on the merits” standard.82 Such a standard, it rea-
soned, was not sufficient to meet the merit requirement imposed by the 
U.S. Supreme Court.83 As further evidence that the TRO was not mer-
its-based, the court observed that, unlike the order in PAPV, the TRO in 
Singer pertained only to the State’s actions against Live Gold.84 That is, 
while the TRO was in operation, the State remained free to enforce the 
challenged law against other parties.85 
                                                                                                                      
 
74 See id. at 234 (quoting Watson v. Cnty. of Riverside, 300 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 
2002)). 
75 See PAPV, 520 F.3d at 234. 
76 See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006). 
77 Singer Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. Milgram, 650 F.3d 223, 229, 231 (3d Cir. 2011) (en 
banc). 
78 Id. at 229–30. 
79 Id. at 229. 
80 Id. at 230. 
81 Id. at 229–30. 
82 Id. at 230. 
83 See Singer, 650 F.3d at 230. 
84 See id. 
85 See id. Compare Singer, 650 F.3d at 230 (concluding that the TRO prevented the State 
from enforcing the statute in a particular manner against plaintiffs), with PAPV, 520 F.3d at 
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 Then, the court considered whether any judgment (looking be-
yond the TRO) was issued on the merits.86 The court first observed that 
there was no determination on the merits because the State mooted 
the case by agreeing with Live Gold’s position at the preliminary in-
junction hearing.87 In doing so, the court implied that when the state 
relinquished its claim at the preliminary hearing, it prevented the court 
from reaching the merits of the claim.88 The court then repeated the 
two resolutions identified by the Buckhannon Court as conferring pre-
vailing-party status—enforceable judgments on the merits and court-
ordered consent decrees—and concluded that Buckhannon “precludes 
the events in this case from qualifying as a third form of resolution that 
can support prevailing party status.”89 The court explained this conclu-
sion by detailing Buckhannon’s rejection of the catalyst theory and con-
cluding that the State’s action was voluntary.90 
 In contrast, the dissents concluded that Live Gold should have 
been granted prevailing-party status and offered alternative means of 
reaching that conclusion within the Buckhannon framework.91 Judge 
Roth concluded that Live Gold was a prevailing party because the TRO 
was a judgment on the merits and the district court permanently al-
tered the legal relationship of the parties by binding the State to its new 
interpretation of the Act.92 She argued that the court’s conclusion (that 
both valid common law trademarks and registered trademarks would 
be recognized henceforth under the TIM Act) satisfied the merits re-
quirement.93 Furthermore, because of the judicial estoppel doctrine, 
the district court permanently altered the legal relationship between 
the parties by binding the State to its new interpretation of the TIM 
Act.94 Moreover, the court’s “bound” statement amounted to a “court-
                                                                                                                      
 
229 (2008) (concluding that the TRO prevented the City from enforcing the statute against 
anyone, not just plaintiffs). 
86 See Singer, 650 F.3d at 231. 
87 Id. 
88 See id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 231–32; see supra note 60 and accompanying text (explaining the catalyst theory). 
91 Singer, 650 F.3d at 232–40 (Roth, J., dissenting) (detailing how naming Live Gold a 
prevailing party would have conformed to Supreme Court precedent); id. at 240–41 (Ald-
isert, J., dissenting) (same). 
92 See id. at 238 (Roth, J., dissenting). 
93 Id. at 233. 
94 Id. at 238–39. The doctrine of judicial estoppel is equitable and essentially allows 
courts to “prevent a litigant from playing fast and loose with the courts” by first espousing 
one theory to gain an advantage in litigation and then espousing another theory, incom-
patible with the first, to gain an inconsistent advantage. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
Although the test for judicial estoppel is not stringent, a federal court typically weighs 
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ordered ‘change in the legal relationship.’”95 Finally, she analogized 
the district court’s binding of the State to a consent decree; in both, a 
court formalizes voluntary conduct resulting in “a material alteration in 
the legal relationship between the parties.”96 
                                                                                                                     
 Similarly, Judge Ruggero Aldisert, in his dissent, rejected the ma-
jority’s holding as an application of conceptual jurisprudence that en-
tirely disregarded the important policy consideration of protecting civil 
rights.97 He concluded that the majority used a “stingy interpretation” 
of the phrase “judicially sanctioned” in light of the facts of the case.98 
That is, rather than focusing on the substance behind the facts, as they 
should have done, the majority focused superficially on the lack of an 
explicit order granting some kind of judgment for the plaintiff.99 
III. Live Gold Should Have Been Deemed a Prevailing Party 
 The en banc majority in Singer reached a restrictive and surprising 
result.100 It did so, in part, by characterizing the district court’s actions 
at the preliminary injunction hearing as a denial of the preliminary 
injunction “because the opposing party’s voluntary change of position 
moot[ed] the case . . . .”101 This portrayal implies that the district court 
made a determination adverse to Live Gold at the preliminary injunc-
tion stage based on the merits, but that was not the case.102 As noted 
 
three factors in determining whether to invoke judicial estoppel: (1) whether the positions 
adopted are “clearly inconsistent”; (2) “whether the party has succeeded in persuading a 
court to accept that party’s earlier position, so that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent 
position in a later proceeding would create ‘the perception that either the first or the sec-
ond court was misled’”; and (3) “whether the party seeking to assert an inconsistent posi-
tion would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing 
party if not estopped.” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750–51 (2001) (internal 
citations omitted) (stating the three factors); Singer, 650 F.3d at 239 (Roth, J., dissenting) 
(noting that the judicial estoppel test is not stringent). 
95 Singer, 650 F.3d at 239 (quoting Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t 
of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604 (2001)). 
96 Id. 
97 See id. at 241 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Conceptual jurisprudence, Judge Aldisert as-
serts, is “a philosophy of jurisprudence no longer in general acceptance . . . a philosophy 
that preaches that a principle, if sound, ought to be applied wherever it logically leads, 
without reference to ulterior results—and wholly inappropriate for cases that touch upon civil 
rights.” Id. 
98 See id. at 242. 
99 Id. 
100 See Singer Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. Milgram, 650 F.3d 223, 232–33 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(en banc) (Roth, J., dissenting); id. at 242 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). 
101 Id. at 224 (majority opinion); id. at 232–33 (Roth, J., dissenting) (discussing the ma-
jority’s characterization of the district court’s actions and reframing the question at issue). 
102 See id. at 232–33; infra notes 103–104 and accompanying text. 
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above, it was only after the district court had repeatedly rejected the 
State’s arguments—and suggested an alternate interpretation—that the 
State “voluntarily” adopted the court’s interpretation.103 The court 
then “bound” the State by its newly adopted interpretation.104 
                                                                                                                     
 The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Buckhannon illustrates why these 
events made Live Gold a prevailing party.105 The Supreme Court fully 
explained its decision to reject the catalyst theory in Buckhannon.106 
First, it explicitly based its rejection on the fact that the catalyst theory 
confers prevailing-party status “where there is no judicially sanctioned 
change in the legal relationship of the parties.”107 Then, it cautioned 
lower courts that it disapproved of awarding prevailing-party status to a 
party that has merely gained a reversal of dismissal for failure to state a 
claim.108 The Court reasoned that such a ruling does not reach the mer-
its of the claim and “is not the stuff of which legal victories are made.”109 
Finally, the Court stressed the requirement of a judicial imprimatur on 
the change in the legal relationship between the parties.110 
 In effect, the district court’s actions in Singer amounted to a judi-
cially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties that was 
based on a determination on the merits.111 The district court judicially 
sanctioned this change first by openly expressing disagreement with the 
defendant’s stance, then by suggesting a potential solution, and finally, 
after the defendant abandoned its position, by binding the defendant 
to its new interpretation.112 The significance of this exchange is that the 
court’s rejection of the State’s arguments and suggestion that the State 
adopt a different interpretation plainly evidenced a conclusion on the 
merits.113 Additionally, having agreed to be bound by the interpretation 
it espoused in court, the State would be subject to judicial estoppel if it 
tried to renege, whether against Live Gold or against other holders of 
valid unregistered trademarks.114 Although judicial estoppel is a discre-
 
 
103 See Singer, 650 F.3d at 226. 
104 Id. 
105 See 532 U.S. 598, 605–06 (2001). 
106 See id.; supra note 60 and accompanying text (explaining the catalyst theory). 
107 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605–06. 
108 Id. (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1987)). 
109 Id. (citing Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 760). 
110 Id. 
111 See infra notes 112–115 and accompanying text. 
112 See Singer, 650 F.3d at 226 (stating the facts); id. at 242 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (con-
struing that, in light of the facts, the change was judicially sanctioned). 
113 See id. at 233 (Roth, J., dissenting); id. at 242 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). 
114 Id. at 239 (Roth, J., dissenting). Here, once the State had reversed course and ac-
cepted that a valid common law trademark must be treated in the same way as a registered 
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tionary doctrine, it is difficult to imagine a circumstance in which the 
State would be released from its in-court agreement to a binding statu-
tory interpretation.115 
 In short, the result in Singer was precisely “the stuff of which legal 
victories are made.”116 Live Gold did not simply obtain some of the 
benefit it sought in bringing suit, it obtained complete relief.117 More-
over, Live Gold’s victory is a boon to other common law trademark 
holders.118 Both Live Gold and other common law trademark holders 
can now prevent the State from requiring them to promote their musi-
cal groups’ performances or productions with labels of salute or trib-
ute.119 If the State ever tried to adopt a contrary interpretation, a party 
would need only file an action drawing the court’s attention to the pre-
liminary injunction hearing at issue in this case.120 
 Furthermore, an in-court relinquishment of a position leading to 
one party being bound to a position is very different from the situations 
in which the Supreme Court has found the requisite judicial imprimatur 
to be lacking.121 In Singer, there was not an out-of-court “alteration of 
actual circumstances,” as when a legislature moots the action or the par-
ties come to an out-of-court settlement.122 Instead, the events in this case 
equate to a consent decree, because the State’s voluntary change of po-
sition occurred in court and the State agreed to be judicially bound by 
its change.123 
 Nonetheless, despite the Third Circuit’s restrictive interpretation 
of Supreme Court jurisprudence, practitioners may take steps to help 
ensure they will be able to collect attorney’s fees.124 The Third Circuit’s 
conclusion in Singer made clear its preference for formal judicial orders 
                                                                                                                      
trademark, the State would be judicially estopped from adopting a contrary interpretation 
of the Act in any subsequent judicial proceeding and certainly in any proceeding against 
Live Gold. Id. 
115 See id. at 233, 239. 
116 See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605; infra notes 117–120 and accompanying text. 
117 See Singer, 650 F.3d at 233 (Roth, J., dissenting) (concluding that Live Gold obtained 
complete relief); id. at 239 (reasoning that the state would be judicially estopped from 
asserting a contrary position in any future proceeding). 
118 See id. at 233, 239. 
119 See id. 
120 See id. at 239. 
121 Compare Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 606 (legislature mooted action), with Singer, 650 
F.3d at 226 (defendant capitulated in court and court bound it to its position). 
122 See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 n.7, 606. 
123 Singer, 650 F.3d at 239 (Roth, J., dissenting). 
124 See infra notes 125–127 and accompanying text. 
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when prevailing-party status is sought.125 Drawing on this and other 
Third Circuit precedents, practitioners who plan to seek attorney’s fees 
in the Third Circuit would do well to request that the court: (1) issue 
an order containing a consent decree or stipulated settlement; (2) in-
clude mandatory language in the order; and (3) provide for judicial 
enforcement in the order.126 Although this will not prevent opposing 
parties from challenging the court’s order, it would at least provide an 
appellate court with an explicit grant of the kind already identified by 
the Supreme Court and Third Circuit as acceptable.127 
Conclusion 
 The Third Circuit in Singer determined that Live Gold did not meet 
the requirements for prevailing-party status under the Civil Rights At-
torney’s Fees Awards Act. It did so by focusing on the fact that the dis-
trict court granted only a temporary restraining order and by character-
izing the State’s change in position as a voluntary change unconstrained 
by a judicial imprimatur. This ruling needlessly expanded the scope of 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Buckhannon by concluding that the 
State’s in-court relinquishment of its argument equated to an out-of-
court settlement or alteration of the circumstances, as when a legislature 
changes a law. Nonetheless, until the Third Circuit recognizes that such 
circumstances confer prevailing-party status, practitioners who find 
themselves in Live Gold’s position should press the court to issue a for-
mal order in the form of a consent decree or stipulated settlement, us-
ing mandatory language and providing for judicial enforcement. 
Kimberley P. Ver Ploeg 
 
125 See Singer, 650 F.3d at 242 (Aldisert, J., dissenting); supra notes 76–99 and accompa-
nying text. 
126 See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 (stating that settlements enforced through consent 
decrees may confer prevailing-party status); Singer, 650 F.3d at 231, 232 (concluding that 
the trial court’s binding of the defendant to an interpretation was insufficient to confer 
prevailing-party status because binding language was not memorialized in an order); 
Truesdell v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 290 F.3d 159, 161, 165 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that a court 
order containing a settlement agreement terms and mandatory language and providing 
for judicial enforcement, was an appropriate means of conferring prevailing-party status). 
127 See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 (naming a consent decree as an acceptable avenue 
to obtain prevailing-party status); Singer, 650 F.3d at 228 (recognizing that court-ordered 
consent decrees confer prevailing-party status); Truesdell, 290 F.3d at 161, 165 (awarding 
prevailing-party status where the plaintiff obtained a court order containing the terms of a 
settlement agreement, mandatory language, and means for judicial enforcement). 
